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ABSTRACT: 
 
During recent years, venture capital investing has become an established funding source with a 
crucial role in supporting economic growth by stimulating innovation. The venture capital indus-
try has developed the tools needed in order to take on the challenging task of nurturing high-
risk, promising new ideas but it is a business marked by uncertainty and gaps in the information 
sharing with their entrepreneurial contracting parties. 
The information asymmetry is a major challenge for venture capital firms, as it makes it difficult 
to assess a firm and enables opportunistic behaviour by entrepreneurs after the financing has 
been received. Previous research has to a great extent focused on information asymmetry oc-
curring prior to the investment decision, whereas this dissertation has explored the less re-
searched topic of post-investment information asymmetry.  
The purpose of the study is to identify, define and evaluate legal mitigation strategies succeeding 
the investment decision from the venture capitalist’s point of view. The research findings are 
that the venture capitalist can through agent constraints, affiliation terms, appointment rights, 
decision rights and agent incentives as well as other contractual strategies mitigate post-invest-
ment risks. The analysis however shows that, while the implications of information asymmetry 
in venture capital investments are well understood, there are still no mechanism that can reduce 
the implications to a complete extent.  
The main conclusion derived from the thesis is that a combination of different mitigation actions 
is the most efficient strategy to target post-investment risks. A combination would secure that 
all post-investment risks are addressed and would, at the same time, reduce the net value of the 
negative consequences that the shortfalls associated with each mechanism potentially causes. 
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Definitions and abbreviations 
 
Venture capitalist Investor that acts as an intermediary between financial institutions 
and unquoted ventures. Invests a certain amount of money which 
makes them entitled to a share of the returns in the business.  
 
Entrepreneur Companies in which the venture capitalist invests 
 
OYL  Osakeyhtiölaki 21.7.2006/624. The limited liability company law in 
Finland 
 
AML  Arvopaperimarkkinalaki 14.12.2012/746. The securities market law 
in Finland 
 








Young entrepreneurial firms in a swift growth phase are frequently met with the need 
to find financial assistance that exceeds their current resources and networks. Even 
though this can be considered as a good prospect for the business itself, the search for 
outside investment can be challenging. For firms with high growth expectations, venture 
capital funds may be the answer to the firm’s capital needs. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). 
During recent years, venture capital investing has become an established funding source 
with a crucial role in supporting economic growth by stimulating innovation (FVCA).  
 
In the first half of year 2020, The Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA) reported a 
record of 245 million euros of venture capital investments received for Finnish compa-
nies, out of which 145 million euros came from foreign investors and 100 million euros 
from Finnish investors. (FVCA). There was a prominent fear that COVID-19 would have a 
significant negative effect on the accumulation of capital funding for early stage invest-
ments, but a recent study shows that the Finnish start-up market is still able to circulate 
capital even to the extent that the outlook is more positive in year 2021 than it was the 
year before (FVCA). 
 
In addition to providing entrepreneurial firms with capital, venture capitalists also pro-
vide their portfolio companies with non-monetary support in the form of expertise and 
network connections. Providing more than capital funding is necessary in order to be 
able to successfully co-invest with an entrepreneur and to get the company expanding 
(Isaksson, 2006). By these non-monetary contributions, venture capitalists can reduce 
risk as well as add value to the venture through their knowhow of specific industries, by 
financial and strategic planning as well as market development recruitment. (Gompers 
& Lerner, 2004).  
 
The venture capital industry may have developed the tools needed in order to take on 
the challenging task of nurturing high-risk, promising new ideas but it is, however, a busi-
ness marked by uncertainty and gaps in the information sharing with their contracting 
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parties. The information asymmetry is a major challenge for venture capital firms that 
invest in companies with a short history, often operating in new industries with a lack of 
historical data. (Gompers et al, 2009). 
 
1.1 Problem area 
Informational gaps, or asymmetries, make it difficult to assess a firm and it also enables 
opportunistic behaviour by entrepreneurs after the financing has been received (Gom-
pers et al, 2009). Information asymmetry generates issues both for the entrepreneur, 
who do not want to be exploited, and for the venture capitalist, who is concerned with 
finding and funding quality deals. The implications of information asymmetry vary de-
pending on the growth stage of the start-up, as well as the stage of the venture capital 
financing (Glücksman, 2020). To address the information asymmetry, venture capitalists 
engage in a variety of control mechanisms (Gompers et al, 2009).  
 
Venture capital investing and the underlying information asymmetry has been of interest 
to researchers in the past decades. Theoretically, the agency theory that separates own-
ership from control (Jensen and Meckling, 1979) and information theory are often used 
when studying contracting issues in venture capital investing. Such theories suggest that 
entrepreneurs possess an informational advantage over the venture capitalist, generat-
ing risk of adverse selection as well as moral hazard (Cumming & Johan, 2014).  
 
The risk for adverse selection is in general more present prior to the investment decision, 
where it primarily deals with issues of hidden information that could lead to poor invest-
ments. The risk for moral hazard focuses on the entrepreneur acting opportunistically to 
the venture capitalist’s disadvantage and is therefore present during the whole invest-
ment cycle. Both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists suffer from principal-agent con-
flict. Entrepreneurs tend to use information asymmetry opportunistically whereas the 




A screening of previous research shows that information asymmetry occurring before 
the investor makes the funding decision is a well-researched topic, where the mitigation 
actions are highly related to the screening process of due diligence that is performed 
prior to the investment. The imbalance that materializes after the investment has been 
made is, in contrast, more unexplored and will be emphasised in this paper.  
 
Amit et al (1998) have examined why venture capital exists and state in their research 
that information asymmetry is the key to understanding the venture capital industry. 
Under their hypothesis, venture capitalists are financial intermediaries with a compara-
tive advantage in working environments where informational asymmetries are promi-
nent. (Amit et al, 1998). By identifying this conflict of interest and settling it through 
different mechanisms, long-term sustainability of the corporate performance can be 
achieved (Marcel et al, 2010).  
 
1.2 Purpose 
This paper approaches information asymmetry from the venture capitalist’s perspective, 
that occurs when the investment has already been made. The purpose of the study is to 
identify, define and evaluate legal mitigation strategies, succeeding the investment de-
cision.  
 
By answering the set research question, the thesis intends to contribute to the academ-
ical field of a fairly new research area in Finland. The aim is also to provide management 
guidance in how to utilize legal mechanisms for targeting post-investment risks arising 






1.3 Research question 
This dissertation takes a critical perspective on the identified problem area, considering 
the purpose by reflecting and providing answers to the research question of: 
 
How venture capitalists can, through legal strategies, mitigate post-investment 
risks related to information asymmetry arising from the relationship with the en-
trepreneur  
 
1.4 Sources  
The core juridical question is centred around the possibilities to mitigate risks by legal 
structures and contracts, as well as the contractual freedom considering contract design.  
 
The sources used in the thesis are both native and foreign research, articles as well as 
literature. The thesis focuses on the legal aspects, whereas the research aim is fulfilled 
under the Finnish legal system and its practices wherever possible. The area of venture 
capital falls primarily under dispositive law, meaning that the contracting parties them-
selves can decide how to operate efficiently in order to achieve their goals.  
 
1.5 Delimitations 
In this paper, informational asymmetry is considered a central characteristic in a venture 
capital investment. The information asymmetry is persistent both prior to the venture 
capitalist investment decision as well as after the investment decision has been made. 
This paper focuses however on the post-investment stage, where information asym-
metry occurs after the investment decision has been made and the parties have entered 
into agreement with one another, thus excluding issues that are present prior to the 
investment decision, such as selection problems. From a theoretical standpoint, this 





The main actors in a venture capital process are the investors, the venture capitalists and 
the entrepreneurs, where venture capitalists act as financial intermediaries (Amit et al, 
1998). This thesis is limited to examine the relationship between the venture capitalists 
and the entrepreneurs, i.e. between the fund providers and the company in need of 
growth capital, and does not extend the analysis to investors. Delimitations have also 
occurred in the analysis of fund providers, as this thesis do not include other funding 
forms such as crowdfunding. 
 
The problems of information asymmetry and the uncertainty in venture capital investing 
can also lead to issues in valuating young entrepreneurial firms and, also, in analysing 
whether venture capitalists are actually able to add value to their portfolio companies 
by their operations. These two valuation aspects are excluded from this thesis and the 
presumption that venture capitalists act as value adding business partners is only as-
sumed but not confirmed in this research. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis takes a cross-functional approach to law and finance in order to examine legal 
mitigation actions for the venture capitalist related to information asymmetry, arising in 
relation to the entrepreneur after an investment decision has been made. Agency prob-
lems and legal strategies act as a foundation for the thesis.  
 
Chapter two explores the concepts of venture capital, where the industry, process and 
internal organization is presented. The venture capital process is reviewed from entry to 
exit, where the chapter covers previous research related to the concept and sets the 
basis for exploring the venture capitalist’s relationship with the entrepreneur. This is fun-
damental for understanding the research, when moving into chapter three that provides 
the theoretical framework of information asymmetry. The theoretical framework begins 
with covering the agency theory, moving into the core problem of the research and 
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unfolding moral hazard and other theories that manages post-investment imbalances 
that generate risks for the venture capitalist.   
 
After having established information asymmetry as a risk that venture capitalists under-
take when investing in an entrepreneurial company, the post-investment implications of 
information asymmetry are examined in more detail in chapter four. The chapter identi-
fies the post-investment risks that are central in the thesis. Chapter four ends with intro-
ducing the concept of risk management and setting the basis for the core of the research 
following in chapter five.  
 
The chapter of legal strategies to mitigate information asymmetry screens actions that 
are at hand for the venture capitalist in order to reduce the negative impacts of risks that 
have been reviewed. A framework is introduced to explore the mitigation actions with 
enhancement from previous research as well as the Finnish legal system. Potential dis-
advantages with the mechanisms are also discussed.   
 
Finally, in chapter six, the research is concluded by discussing the key findings, academ-
ical and managerial contributions, limitations as well as suggestions for further research.  
 












2 Venture Capital 
Venture capital financing refer to a form of equity financing, where stocks in unlisted 
companies are bought in exchange for a percentage of ownership. The two terms ven-
ture capital and private equity differ primarily in regards to the development stage of the 
company in which they invest, where venture funds are typically set up for earlier-stage 
firms (seed or start-ups) and private equity is broader in the sense that they also cover 
later-stage investments (FVCA). There is no univocal definition for venture capital fund-
ing, but venture capital funds are generally identified as financial intermediaries be-
tween sources of funds and high-growth entrepreneurial firms (Cumming and Johan, 
2014).  
 
The purpose of the investments is achieving a return on the invested capital on a long-
term by developing their investee companies (FVCA). Venture capitalist activity has a 
significant impact on the global economies in terms of job creation, innovation and tech-
nology advancement (Gerken & Whittaker, 2014) and operate together with the entre-
preneurs in accelerating companies’ growth. Venture financing does thus not only mean 
money, but also knowhow, network connections as well as partnership. (FVCA). 
 
Venture capital investors are on the look-out for growth companies that within three to 
five years have the potential to be market leaders within their industry. Above all, they 
look for high growth industries with large market potential and companies with strong 
management teams as well as unique business models. Venture capital firms invest rel-
atively big amounts into the companies and intends the funds to be used for accelerating 
the growth of the company, that will later provide the expected return. (Vinturella & 
Erickson, 2013).  
 
Venture capitalist provides the entrepreneur with equity or debt of hybrid forms of fi-
nancing, in combination with their expertise (Amit et al, 1998). In exchange for the in-
vestment, the investor obtains a percentage of ownership in the company that is in pro-
portion to the invested amount and involved risk (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013).  
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2.1 The venture capital industry 
The first venture capital fund is traced back to 1946 (Lerner & Nanda, 2020) and, since 
then, successful companies like Apple Computer, Microsoft and Intel have been aided by 
venture capital investments during their early operating years (Vinturella & Erickson, 
2013). The so called “dotcom-bubble” gave the venture capital market a boost during 
the early 2000’s, which decreased due to the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. The 
market has again been able to recover (NVCA) and is signifying a positive outlook in Fin-
land (FVCA) as noted in chapter 1.  
 
The venture capital industry is recognized of being a subject to booms and downswings 
and of experiencing periodic investment cycles like other markets do (Gerken & Whit-
taker, 2014). The venture capital investing and the stock market developments are 
strongly interlinked, where Cumming (2014) puts forth that the nature of investments 
tends to vary with different cycles in the stock market as well as the initial public offering 
(IPO) market (Cumming & Johan, 2014). This phenomenon is prominent at the exit stage 
of an investment, where the venture capitalists harvest their primary revenues. In an 
economy with increased risk aversion and uncertainties, the stock market is unreceptive 
to IPOs. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). Sudden downturns that disrupt the plans of exiting 
an investment could also add to the pressure of selling when the market conditions per-
mit, even if the growth opportunities are not fully realized (Lerner & Nanda, 2020). 
 
Governments have as well a key position in influencing the growth of venture capital 
investing by creating new or modifying existing conditions (Armour et al, 2009). The ven-
ture capital industry in Finland has increased from the establishment of private venture 
capital funds, including captive funds established by banks. This is associated with an 
important regulatory change which since 1994 has permitted insurance companies to 
invest in venture capital funds. (Lumme et al, 2013).  
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2.2 The venture capital process  
Venture capitalists invest in start-ups and growth companies (FVCA) at different devel-
opment stages that all have their unique capital needs (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). Lack 
of capital has been identified as a primary inhibitor to success, which is most prominent 
for young start-ups, that often lack adequate revenue during early operating years, as 
well as for rapidly growing companies (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). Since growing with 
cash flow can be slow or even impossible, companies can with the aid from outside in-
vestors, such as venture capitalists, gain an advantage that continues to grow by the 
years (FVCA). Previous academic studies have shown that firms backed by venture capital 
funding are, on average, more successful in terms of innovativeness than firms that are 
not venture capital backed (Dessí & Yin, 2012). 
 
A venture capitalists’ primary activities are according to Ramsinghani (2014) three-
folded; raising the venture fund, finding investment opportunities and generating finan-
cial returns (Ramsinghani, 2014). As illustrated in Figure 2, the venture capital process 
could be displayed by five different phases that are interlinked between each other due 




Figure 2: The Venture Capital Process (Isaksson, 2006)  
 
2.2.1 Establishing a fund 
The starting point for the investment process is establishing a fund from where the in-
vestments are made (Isaksson, 2006). Venture capital firms form a fund by raising invest-
ment capital from different institutions, or from high-net worth individuals, and use the 




Venture funds are, in general, set up as limited partnerships, which constitutes a contract 
between investors, who become limited partners, and the fund manager that is respon-
sible for the routine operations and management of the funds as a general partner (Cum-
ming & Johan, 2014). Through limited partnerships, capital investments are made in a 
set-up by which the venture capital firm obtain a role as the general partner (Isaksson, 
2006). Limited partnerships increase the firm’s access to capital, providing growth op-
portunities for the target company that is not as limited as it could be in other organiza-
tional forms, such as general partnerships. It is common for a venture capital firm to set 
up new limited partnerships for each round of financing that the firm undertakes. (Vin-
turella & Erickson, 2013).  
 
The fund manager is the one playing a significant role in building up the value of the 
target company by providing their expertise (Cumming & Johan, 2014). Limited partner-
ships are established and licensed under state law, where the limited partners provide 
capital but are not allowed to be involved in the daily operations of the business and 





Figure 3: The VC Fund Structure (NVCA) 
 
The funds that venture capitalists manage, also called investment portfolios, can range 
in size from a few million euros to billions of euros. The average life of a fund is set for a 
specific time period, usually of ten years, with new funds forming every couple of years 
that run alongside the existing funds. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013; Cumming & Johan, 
2014). There is a possibility to extend the length of the fund with one or two more years. 
Usually the venture capitalist has five years in which the capital is invested and are after 
that expected to use the remaining years of the fund to collect their investments. (Lerner 
& Nanda, 2020).  
 
As with any other business model, venture capitalists need an investment strategy. This 
is usually executed by targeting a special set of investment opportunities (Isaksson, 
2006). The funds that a venture capitalist manages are often directed toward companies 
in a certain growth-stage, different industries or toward specific geographical areas. (Vin-
turella & Erickson, 2013). The portfolio size of a fund varies between the industry and 
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the stage of investment. In technology sectors, the capital needs are lower, risks are 
deemed higher and growth rate of companies is faster. In comparison, life science com-
panies have a larger capital need and need more time to reach maturation. Hence, a 
technology venture fund has, in general, more companies in its portfolio than life science 
funds. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013).   
 
The flexibility of funding is a central characteristic in the venture capital business model. 
Successful investors can maintain a portfolio of projects and reallocate resources from 
failing ventures to high-performing investments. (Bozkaya & Kerr, 2014). As new funds 
are forming continuously, successful firms do not wait until liquidation of the previous 
fund but raise their next fund as soon as most of the capital of the current fund is in-
vested for existing portfolio companies (Ramsinghani, 2014). The number of funds that 
the venture capitalist manages can therefore vary between two to two dozen, and each 
portfolio company should indicate a potential to generate a return of 8 to 10 times the 
capital invested. (Ramsinghani, 2014).  
 
Another parameter of a funding strategy is the development stage of the venture (Isaks-
son, 2006) which has a crucial role in the investment decision (FVCA). Figure 4 illustrates 
one way of categorising the different development stages that a growing firm passes. 
Venture capitalists often focus on a specific stage and investment size and adjust their 
equity stake accordingly. For example, investors investing in start-ups usually seek for a 
10-30 percent stake of the company. (FVCA). Depending on the financing stage, the ven-
ture capitalist faces different types of risks that will need to be managed and monitored, 
and throughout the stages their involvement in the company will gradually decrease. 
The premise is that, while the relationship between the venture capitalist and entrepre-





Figure 4: Venture Capital Role in a Startup’s Growth (NVCA) 
 
The goal of venture investments is solely financial in contrast to company subsidiaries, 
corporate venture capital firms, that primarily invest for strategic purposes. Corporate 
ventures invest the parent company money and do not utilize outside investor aid. (Vin-
turella & Erickson, 2013). Venture capitalists do not, generally, invest a lot of their own 
money, which distinguishes them also from what is known as angel investors (Gerken & 
Whittaker, 2014).  
 
Early stage funding is typically used for product development and marketing funds, 
whereas later stage funding allows a firm to grow in a more rapid pace than retained 
earnings alone would allow. In a successful venture capital investment, the funded firm 
will reach the point where it can go public, allowing the venture capitalists to realize a 
return on their investment and exit the firm. Alternatively, venture capitalists can cash 
out by selling the firm to another company. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). The venture 
capital investment always ends with a divestment of the company, where the investors 




2.2.2 Deal flow 
In this stage, the direction of the investment money is decided (Caselli, 2018). The ap-
proaches to discovering new venture opportunities could be divided into a proactive and 
reactive approach. A proactive venture capitalist actively seeks potential companies to 
invest in, whereas a reactive venture capitalist awaits business plan proposals to arrive 
to them. (Isaksson, 2006). In Europe, potential target companies are researched by the 
investor through direct marketing operations, making a leverage network an important 
element in finding deals (Caselli, 2018).  
 
Venture capital investors are constantly on the lookout for companies with growth po-
tential. Start-ups are seen more active to seek investment in comparison to growth com-
panies. Growth companies may, however, begin the investment process themselves, by 
utilizing investment banks and advisors to find a suitable investor. (FVCA).  
 
In order to spread the risks as well as broaden the range of opportunities and the 
knowledge base (Isaksson, 2006) the venture capitalist might use syndication, which is a 
coordinated investment between two or more venture capitalists (Amit et al, 1998). Syn-
dication is argued to enable better decision making as to whether to invest or not as well 
as supports the cooperation in company valuation at an exit stage (Cumming & Johan, 
2014). With syndication it is also possible to mitigate informational asymmetries (Amit 
et al, 1998), that for example generate agency problems such as hold up (Cumming & 
Johan, 2014).   
 
2.2.3 Investment decision 
Venture capitalists look for strong management teams and eccentric business models, 
and it is said that for every hundred plans that reaches a venture capital firm, approxi-
mately ten will be seriously considered and only one will be funded. (Vinturella & Erick-
son, 2013).  Without strong credentials, many firms will not even be considered 
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(Cumming & Johan, 2014) as venture capitalists usually are cautious to invest without 
sufficient evidence on a company’s growth potential. 
 
For companies that make the cut in the screening process, due diligence is often the 
starting point for the investment process. The fund manager usually wants an in-depth 
analysis of the venture and brings in external consultants to review the technology and 
gain legal and financial advice. Prior to the due diligence process, a term sheet is drafted 
by the fund manager which contains the knowledge of the deal at that time and sets out 
the general terms and conditions of the investment. (Cumming & Johan, 2014).  
 
Determining the current and future value of the firm is an important step in the negoti-
ation process. One feasible approach to the financing is to project the company’s future 
capital needs in terms of growth stage, each marked by individual capital requirements 
and measurable milestones. Common milestones in a seed company could for example 
be the completion of a prototype or a first sale. Predicting the future is risky and since 
the venture investments are based on future results, there is a risk that entrepreneurs 
are overly optimistic in their projections. Investors therefore want to receive realistic and 
meaningful financial forecasts from the target companies and expect the entrepreneurs 
to demonstrate an in-depth understanding of their operating market through its busi-
ness plan. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). 
 
The business plan projections are based on financial statements, where sales, expenses 
and assets are of interest, along with a demonstration of the market of the products 
(Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). In some cases, the target company does not have a report-
ing system in place that is able to support the investor in following up and monitoring 
the results. As this is vital for the quality of the company’s administration and manage-
ment, a functioning reporting system is something that the venture capitalist could be 




Venture capitalists invest with the expectations of the funds to be used for accelerating 
the growth of the company sufficiently to provide the expected return, since the future 
return on investment is tied to the performance of the company (Vinturella & Erickson, 
2013). The fund returns are measured by internal rate of return (IRR) and are a function 
the two factors time and capital. In order to obtain a high IRR, the portfolio company 
should be sold as fast as possible for as high an amount as possible. (Ramsinghani, 2014). 
Many venture capitalists set targets for their desired rate of return on their set of invest-
ments, which can be between 25-40 percent (Reid, 1998). 
 
There are thus several implications arising already prior to the actual investment deci-
sion, that could lead to informational asymmetries between the parties. As will be cov-
ered later, these scenarios arising prior to the investment decision are generally referred 
to as adverse selection and are not at the core of this thesis. However, if they exist prior 
to the investment they will likely generate moral hazard issues lasting throughout the 
inter-contractual period. 
 
Nonetheless, at the core of the venture capital investment is the transfer of capital and 
competence from the venture capitalist to the entrepreneurial firm. Conveying the cap-
ital is the final ending of the investment decision (even though it is rare that all capital is 
transferred at once) whereas transferring competence is done in the value adding phase. 
(Isaksson, 2006). 
 
2.2.4 Value adding 
Venture capitalists play a crucial role in enhancing the value of the target firm by speed-
ing up the professionalization (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013) by providing non-financial 
assistance to their portfolio companies (De Clerq & Manigart, 2007). Aside from the fi-
nancial support, venture capitalists help build the internal organization of the company, 
by providing administrative, marketing and strategic advice as well as a network consist-
ing of for example lawyers, investment bankers and other industry operators. (Cumming 
& Johan, 2014; Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). Investors usually have a vast experience and 
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knowhow of both pitfalls and keys to growth through having invested in large groups of 
growth companies. Venture capitalists often bring with them a professional governance 
model to a company’s board of directors, to secure the pre-requisites for later acquisi-
tions or IPOs. (FVCA). If a venture capitalist chooses to syndicate their investments, syn-
dications have the potential to strengthen the value enhancement, as they enable col-
laboration and knowledge sharing to an investment that possess informational imbal-
ances (Caselli, 2018).  
 
Managing and monitoring is a part of the venture capital process. These factors are in 
place to ensure the value creation of the company and to control potential opportunistic 
behaviour by the entrepreneur. (Caselli, 2018). The venture capitalist activity level in the 
portfolio company is dependent on the strategy of the investor as well as the stage of 
the investment. An active venture capitalist can transfer their resources and compe-
tences by for example active governance, where they participate in the board of direc-
tors or helping with leveraging the network. (Isaksson, 2006). The active involvement is 
also a key strategy in mitigating information asymmetry (Amit et al, 1998). The venture 
capitalist could for example in this phase stage their financing in order to control such 
risks (Tennert et al, 2018). 
 
As previously noted, the duration of a venture capital investment will vary depending on 
the company prerequisites. Scholars have argued that venture capitalists will continue 
to invest in a firm if the provided marginal value added exceeds the marginal cost of 
maintaining the investment. Hence, ceteris paribus, the investment duration would be 
longer in a situation where the value added is greater. As the portfolio companies seldom 
have cash flow to pay interests on debt or equity dividends, venture capitalists primarily 
invest for the capital gains of an exit. (Cumming & Johan, 2014).   
 
2.2.5 Exit strategy 
A successful venture capital investment always ends in an exit, which is a detachment 
from the company (FVCA) and is the primary securement for the investor to obtain a 
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positive return on their initial investment (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). Even though exit 
strategies are placed as the last part of the process, they are considered throughout the 
investment period (Isaksson, 2006) as the exit strategy is defined as the method by which 
investors can realize a tangible return on the investment (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). 
In this last step, the venture capitalist sells their stake to not only gain the value added 
by the monetary investment, but also the return on the conducted management and 
control (Caselli, 2018). The exist stage is further a mechanism for mitigating conse-
quences of information asymmetry, as will later be covered, as it provides the venture 
capitalist with the possibility to dissociate from opportunistic entrepreneurs (Armour et 
al, 2009).  
 
The commitment of capital is dependent on whether the investor will recover their initial 
investment with addition of a profit. Converting the investor’s ownership into a liquid 
form is referred to as a liquidity event (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013), that usually takes 
the form of an IPO or of an acquisition (FVCA). In an IPO, the stocks of the company are 
offered to the public and the company can, in addition to selling old stocks, also raise 
new capital by issuing shares. Acquisition means selling a company to another company, 
a new investor or to management. (FVCA). 
 
Other exit strategies include secondary sales, buyback and forced liquidation of the com-
pany. In a secondary sale the venture capital firm sells only their part of venture shares 
to a third party, which thereby differ from an acquisition where the whole company is 
put to sale. The third party is often another financial institution or another venture cap-
italist and would, from an informational asymmetric point of view, put the second-round 
investor in the same situation as the first-round investor has been. In a buyback, the 
entrepreneur buys out the venture capitalist by a repurchase of the venture capitalist’s 
shares. If a buyback occurs, it has usually been an item already at the contracting stage 
and included in the exit clauses. Liquidation cases can be seen as the worst-case scenario, 
where the company is forced into bankruptcy and liquidation if the venture fails. (Isaks-
son, 2006).  
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In a study conducted by Cumming (2006) it was shown that IPOs are more frequent in 
countries with a higher legality index. Previous research has further put forth that the 
choice between IPO and acquisition is highly influenced by the stock market, in hot mar-
kets IPOs dominate and acquisitions are more common in down markets. Typically, when 
the market conditions allow, the returns are higher in an IPO than in an M&A. Manage-
ment buyouts require cash from the operations of the business, and are therefore mostly 
occurring in ventures that are consistently able to generate strong positive cash flows. 
(Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). Nevertheless, Cumming (2006) argue that the legal system 
in a country is more directly connected to IPO exits compared to the size of a country’s 
stock market. (Cumming, 2006).  
 
Investors are often more anxious than the entrepreneur to exit from the venture, as the 
entrepreneurs are more focused on building long-term value achieved by raising capital 
for the launch and expansion of their business, and may not even want to exit the firm 
at all. To the entrepreneur’s potential distress, an exit opportunity could be presented 
through an acquisition by another company, where the entrepreneur may be forced to 
buy out the investors or lose control of the company. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013).  
 
Previous research has also shown that some venture capitalists seek a premature IPOs 
in order to obtain reputation and report on an increased performance (De Clerq & Man-
igart, 2007). In practice, a speedy exit can be problematic due to clashes with market 
conditions, and normally the exit horizons are six to eight years. (Ramsinghani, 2014). 
 
2.3 Venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship 
The premises for venture capital investing are usually that the deal would end up bene-
fiting both parties, since the actors would have the same interests at heart (FVCA). The 
main actors in a venture capital process could be divided into a supply side and a demand 
side. On the supply side are the investors, i.e. the fund providers, and the venture capi-
talists. The entrepreneurs constitute the demand side. The venture capitalists act as 
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financial intermediaries between the investors and the entrepreneurial firms that re in 
need of capital. (Cumming & Johan, 2014).  
 
The relationship between the supply and the demand side is both contractual and recip-
rocal with a foundation in mutual trust. If one of the actors breaks the trust, it affects 
the relationship negatively (Isaksson, 2006). As will be concluded in the next chapter, this 
sets the basis for an agency relationship which arise whenever a relationship is formed 
between economic actors, where the welfare of one party depends on the actions of the 
other (Marcel et al, 2010). The sharing of ownership and control between the parties is 
often the factor that causes implications in the relationship (Isaksson, 2006) and sets the 
stage for information asymmetry (Cumming & Johan, 2014). 
 
The venture capitalist wants to seal a deal with an entrepreneur in order to potentially 
hit a profitable investment opportunity and find a unique skill- or knowledge-sharing 
arrangement, where ownership and control is shared. The entrepreneur’s interest to en-
ter a contract with a venture capitalist, on the other hand, lies in gaining additional eq-
uity-based funding, spreading the risk by involving the investor in the daily business op-
erations and accessing an expanded network (Cumming & Johan, 2014; Werner et al, 
2016). During the investment, the entrepreneur usually gives up some of the ownership 
in the company with the hopes that the company will grow such that the remaining own-
ership is worth more than the original stake when an exit point is reached. (FVCA).  
 
In general, private equity investors are motivated by an aptitude for high-risk. In a ven-
ture capital investment, potentially high remuneration is supporting the high-risk initia-
tives, but the realization of operations is still a challenging task (Caselli, 2018). Since ven-
ture capitalists are familiar with high-risk investments, they have been argued to be able 
to mitigate information asymmetry by using their skills (Reid, 1998).  
 
There is a correlation between the firm’s ability to access different capital sources and 
the degree of information asymmetry faced by their investors as well as their ability to 
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mitigate such information asymmetry. Information asymmetry is grounded in the entre-
preneur knowing more about the business than an external investor, which is both a risk 
and a cost to the investor. (Cumming & Johan, 2014). The asymmetry creates an unequal 
balance in power that the venture capitalist needs to monitor and control. If control 
mechanisms are missing, then entrepreneur opportunism is a likely consequence that 









3 Information Asymmetry  
In perfect capital markets, all actors have access to the same information at the same 
time. Conventionally put, the buyer and the seller of goods are, in perfect capital markets, 
presumed to have the same information about the goods being sold (Hillier, 1997). Re-
alistically though, one counterparty in a business transaction often possess an infor-
mation advantage over the other one and the information is shared unequally 
(Glücskman, 2020), giving rise to information asymmetry. Irrespectively of the contract-
ing parties’ relationship, interaction and sources of information in a financial transaction, 
there is an informational imbalance that could give rise to conflicts of interest (Välimäki, 
2014).  
 
The dilemma of information asymmetry in economic settings is usually illustrated with 
an agent, on one side of the contract, that possess an informational upper hand on the 
counterparty of the principal. Referring to the example of the seller and the buyer of 
goods, the seller as an agent usually has more information about the qualities of the 
goods, compared to the potential buyer that is here considered as a principal. (Hillier, 
1997).  
 
When the counterparties do not have access to the same information at the same point 
of time, the parties will inevitably have different behaviours that could have an impact 
on the performance of the company. Thus, within the theory of information asymmetry, 
the information that parties hold and the decision they can take based on that is of cru-
cial importance. (Marcel et al, 2010).  
 
3.1 The agency theory 
The problems of a principal-agent relationship arise when a principal hires an agent un-
der conditions of ambiguous and asymmetric information (Cumming & Johan, 2014). At 
the core of agency theory is hence a relationship much like a contract (Caselli, 2018). 
Under the assumption that people seek to utility maximize own interests, the agent is 
31 
 
presumed to behave against the best interests of the principal, which in turn affect the 
principal’s financial returns. (Cumming & Johan, 2014). The central implication is that 
due to the agent frequently having an informational upper hand on the principal about 
relevant facts, the principal cannot verify that the agent’s actions are aligned with the 
shared goals or what was agreed. Thereby, the agent is incentivized to act opportunisti-
cally and minimize the effort that is put in which affects the value. To prevent this, the 
principal has to engage in costly monitoring processes. (Armour et al, 2009).  
 
The agency theory model is highly dependent on how the information flows between 
the agent and the principal (Reid, 1998). Since it is impossible to continually monitor the 
activities of the other party, the agent can act in contradiction with the interests of the 
principal. By contract design, incentives can be implemented to steer the agent to work 
toward the common goals. Many actions by the agent are however observable but not 
verifiable, which makes it impossible to design a contract that anticipates and addresses 
all possible scenarios and thus the agency problem will prevail to some extent. Even 
though all eventualities cannot be foreseen, anticipated agency problems can be ad-
dressed while mitigating the capacity for other agency problems to develop. (Cumming 
& Johan, 2014).  
 
Information asymmetry cannot however be solved solely by information but requires a 
consideration also of the agent’s control over the firm’s accounting systems. Accounting 
provides financial measurements in the form of inputs and outcomes, which is a vital 
part of the flow. Accounting information both for driving investment decisions and for 
assessing the performance. (Reid, 1998). 
 
Costs that arise from the conflict of interest where the agent does not act in the best 
interest of the principal are referred to as agency costs. The term refers to activities that 
one contracting party may do, that are of self-interest and against the interests of the 
other contracting party (Cumming & Johan, 2014). Agency costs can take a multifaceted 
form. For example, the agent may shirk their job responsibilities if their effort is not 
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verifiable or may keep a loss-making project going if they see a chance to act opportun-
istically. (Wang & Zhou, 2004). Jensen and Meckling (1976) have addressed the realiza-
tion of agency costs that arise from the information asymmetry between contracting 
parties in their influential article of Agency Theory, which separates ownership from con-
trol within ownership corporations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) a commitment between one or more principals 
and an agent, where the principal engages the agent to execute service on their behalf 
constitutes an agency relationship. The conducted performance involves delegation of 
decision-making power, which can cause a conflict of interest if the agent pursues max-
imizing own interests, and thereby not act in the best interest of the principal. The prin-
cipal can limit the conflict of interest by agency costs, which is an establishment of pay-
ment incentives for the agent, or by incurring monitoring costs that limit undesirable 
actions from the agent. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
The agency theory argues that venture capital investments constitute complicated 
agreements where specific clauses must be worked out in order to realize a deal (Caselli, 
2018). Other corporate governance scholars claim that the conflict of interest arise as 
the incentives of managers are not fully aligned with those of their institutions, and have 
traditionally focused on the topics of reducing top-management conflicts of interest and 
of improving board governance (Sun et al, 2011).   
 
3.2 Moral hazard 
One form of information asymmetry is a moral hazard-circumstance, which is often oc-
curring in economic activities and refer to agency problems that may arise in a form of 
hidden actions after the contract is sealed and entered between a principal and an agent 
(Cumming & Johan, 2014). Moral hazard was first introduced in insurance markets, 
where insured parties can undertake actions to either decrease or increase risks. Even 
though moral hazard-implications can arise in any economic activity and investment en-




Kotowitz (1989) define moral hazard as actions in economical transactions, where the 
agent utility maximizes his/her own interests at the expense of the principal. After the 
contracting stage, a principal-agent relationship exists between the venture capitalist 
and the entrepreneur. The venture capitalist is the principal in the relationship and the 
entrepreneur the agent, where the principal is put in a position of addressing moral haz-
ard implications. (Kotowitz, 1989).  
 
These situations often occur where the utility maximizing agent do not bear the full con-
sequences, or benefits, of their actions. Moral hazard originates in a control issue where 
the agent’s actions are perceptible, but not the information on which they are based, 
(Kotowitz, 1989) which in turn makes the agent’s efforts unobservable (Mishra & Zachary, 
2015) and legally unverifiable (Amit et al, 1998). The entrepreneur might thus not pro-
vide the desired level of effort and may choose not to conduct tasks that maximizes the 
investor’s return (Mishra & Zachary, 2015). The agent also often has access to infor-
mation that is not available to the principal unless the agent shares the information (De 
Clerq & Manigart, 2007). In practice, the agent can withhold information from the prin-
cipal or put in minimal effort, which affects the expected payoffs of the principal nega-
tively.  
 
The entrepreneurs are motivated to act in self-interest, even if it means imposing costs 
on the other party (Amit et al, 1998), by consuming the perks and putting in minimal 
effort in their actions (Reid, 1998). They have the potential advantage of obtaining full 
benefits but only bearing a proportion of the costs. The principal therefore wants to 
agree on decreasing the effects of moral hazard, which can be done either in a positive 
or negative sense. The principal can put up bounding, through which penalties are im-
posed on the investor if certain milestones are not met or, more positively, also establish 





The principal may also attempt to influence the agent by monitoring the performance. 
Monitoring refers to mechanisms that the venture capitalist uses to evaluate the entre-
preneur’s behaviour and performance in order to keep track of the investment (De Clerq 
& Manigart, 2007). Since a direct observation of the agent’s actions is impractical, the 
performance is measured by the results of the agent’s actions (Reid, 1998). The principal 
often has strong incentives to monitor the agent’s actions, as the interests of the parties 
are not always aligned (De Clerq & Manigart, 2007).  
 
The negative aspects of monitoring are two-fold, firstly it is difficult for a principal to 
distinguish what the agent is doing in good faith and what is the effort and intent behind. 
Secondly, the agent possesses more knowledge over the business operations compared 
to the principal, whereas there is an imbalance of information. The agent may also pro-
vide information selectively, in order to show outcomes as more favourable than they 
are in reality. (Reid, 1998).  
 
3.3 Other theories on information asymmetry 
Another phenomenon of information asymmetry is called a hold-up situation. These are 
circumstances where there is unequal bargaining power between contracting parties, 
where the contracting party with a stronger bargaining power may “hold up” the other 
party and renegotiate the terms of the original contract. In a venture capital scenery, the 
investor could provide the entrepreneur with a large amount of capital, but it would be 
the entrepreneur who can ensure the success of the venture and thus have the power 
to renegotiate the investment terms. (Cumming & Johan, 2014).  
 
Window dressing, on the other hand, refers to making something look as good as possi-
ble on the outside relative to what is the reality. This could mean that entrepreneurs 
have an interest in making their firm look as good as possible on the outside to secure 
the next financing round from their investor. Therefore, entrepreneurs may have the in-
centive to exaggerate projected sales or anything else that convinces the venture capi-
talist to continue investing in the firm, putting the venture capitalist at great accounting 
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risks. Typically, the short-term benefits from window dressing are inferior to the long-
term costs that it causes. (Cumming & Johan, 2014).  
 
The entrepreneur having an informational advantage about the prospects of the firm 
could also generate a possibility for the entrepreneur to communicate the standpoint of 
the firm to something else than what it is to the investor, while misusing the firm’s assets. 
This is referred to as asset stripping. Later in a potential bankruptcy, the stripping of as-
sets is difficult to prove. (Cumming & Johan, 2014).  
 
If the venture would be financed with debt capital, the entrepreneur has an incentive to 
conduct risk shifting, by increasing the risk profile of the firm which would transfer the 





4 Information Asymmetry and the Venture Capitalist 
The information asymmetry is a vital issue in the venture capital financing and often 
leads to agency problems that arise due to either hidden information or hidden actions 
from the other party. Hidden information surfaces when one party is in possession of 
relevant information that is unknown to the other party which is known as an adverse 
selection status, that is often present prior to the contracting stage where the entrepre-
neur has an upper hand in knowing their business. Hidden actions, on the other hand, 
are present in the stage that follows the investment and is known as a moral hazard stage. 
Moral hazard is marked by an uncertainty of the entrepreneur’s actions, which the ven-
ture capitalist cannot observe. Such a case could for example be that the entrepreneur 
does not spend the invested capital accordingly with the interest of the venture capitalist. 
(Glücksman, 2020).  
 
Venture capital funds are often directed toward entrepreneurial firms with significant 
information asymmetries, as the funded firm usually does not have a lengthy operating 
history (Cumming and Johan, 2014) and it has a significant amount of intangible assets 
(Amit et al, 1998). Since entrepreneurial firms lack assets to provide as securities and 
also lack the necessary track record to establish a reputation, the effects of informational 
market failures are more severe in entrepreneurial finance than in financing established 
firms. Such market failures could lead to profitable projects being unfunded or under-
funded. The more skilled a venture capitalist is in reducing the sources of market failure, 
the more effective is the functioning. (Amit et al, 1998). 
 
The moral hazard dilemma that was reviewed in the previous chapter is prominent in 
venture capital investing (Glücksman, 2020). According to Kotowitz (1989), the moral 
hazard dilemma occurs after the contracting stage when the venture capitalist fears that 
the entrepreneur is acting opportunistically and only utility maximizing own interests at 
the expense of the investor and/or hiding essential information. Because of the infor-
mation asymmetry, the investor sees a need to monitor the actions and decision making 
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of the entrepreneur, thus creating agency costs. (Kotowitz, 1989). The empirical signifi-
cance of monitoring is supported by previous research, such as Lerner (1994). 
 
In the context of this paper, the venture capitalist is considered as a principal and the 
entrepreneur as an agent. Many of the operations performed by venture capitalists in-
volves agency costs (Cumming and Johan, 2014), which emerge when the entrepreneur 
sees to utility maximize the resources to own gains, instead of considering the interests 
of the investor. The entrepreneurs are, in general, considered to have more insight in 
their company and its daily operations (Glücksman, 2020) which they could be reluctant 
to share with the venture capitalist (Werner et al, 2016).  
 
It is important for the venture capitalist to know which uncertainties they want to miti-
gate and which the pain points are that causes information asymmetry. Following, risks 
related to the post-investment stage will be identified.  
 
4.1 Post-investment risks 
As has been stated, a crucial problem in the venture capital business is the information 
asymmetry between the entrepreneurs and capital providers (Glücksman, 2020). Con-
flicts may arise already at the investment stage due to misaligned expectations between 
the venture capitalists and the entrepreneur’s future roles. Since the roles are subject to 
contracts, the initial contract is seen as a basis for a successful co-operation. (Isaksson, 
2006). 
 
After the initial investment has been made, managing the portfolio companies contains 
information asymmetrical risks to the venture capitalist, as the entrepreneurial oppor-
tunism can take the form of differing goals, changes in behaviour and an unequal distri-
bution of essential information. There are also risks associated directly with young firms 
that may cause information asymmetry toward the venture capitalists, without direct 





Figure 5: Post-investment risks  
 
4.1.1 Change in behaviour 
A key characteristic of a principal-agent relationship is that the agent has an incentive to 
decrease effort and to avoid risk (Reid, 1998). The principal is looking for signing a con-
tract that will give incentives to optimize effort and share the risk. Both parties are ex-
pected to be looking for utility maximizing their own interests, where the venture capi-
talist experiences utility as a net effect of the payoff less what the agent is paid, whereas 
the entrepreneur experiences utility as positively dependent on the received payment 
less their own efforts. (Reid, 1998).   
 
Change in behaviour is a prominent risk of human aspects in the venture capital business, 
as the personal attitude of the entrepreneur could change negatively after they have 
received the capital funding. The entrepreneur could be neglecting and unwilling to 
make efforts that meet the common goals and interests with the venture capitalist. (Bi-
gus, 2002). This potential lack of commitment is a risk that the investor wants to avoid, 
as it puts the effectiveness of the company at risk (Caselli, 2018).  
 
As earlier mentioned, the venture capitalist often seeks a board position which would 
indicate attending board meetings. However, if the venture capitalist does not attend 
board gatherings or otherwise in the strategic decision-making, the entrepreneur is able 
to act out of sight of the investor to own benefits, creating moral hazard. If the agent can 
act out of sight of the investor, then it is also possible that he or she can claim high effort 
without actually having made it if a profitable outcome arises. (Reid, 1998). Since effort 
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is only potentially observable, not verifiable, the agent cannot be forced to put in effort. 
It is, however, possible to incentivize effort. (Cumming & Johan, 2014). 
 
It has been showed that lower degrees of ownership increase the likelihood of the en-
trepreneur to act opportunistically (Bellavitis et al, 2019). After the investment, the en-
trepreneur owns less than one hundred percent equity in the venture. By giving up some 
equity to the investor, the entrepreneur shares the results of efforts with the investor, 
where the entrepreneurial effort will then be proportional to her percentage of equity 
in the venture and inversely proportional to the investor’s percentage of equity. (Mishra 
& Zachary, 2015).  
 
The moral hazard implications arise as the entrepreneur can act out of sight of the in-
vestor, and therefore have the possibility to claim high effort without having done any-
thing to support a profitable outcome (Reid, 1998). The entrepreneur could thereby not 
exert the same level of effort as would have, if the ownership in the venture was one 
hundred percent. The more equity that is given to the investor, the less will be the effort 
and desire for the entrepreneur to maximize the investor’s return. This puts forth a need 
for the venture capitalist to exercise control (Mishra & Zachary, 2015) that, in turn, gen-
erates agency costs.  
 
4.1.2 Misaligned interests  
One of the most common issues are the different values and goals between the investor 
and the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs place a high value on financial returns, but are at 
the same time interested in autonomy, control and in creating a successful new business. 
Thus, they may be hesitant toward a quick exit or to undertake actions that weakens 
their ownership in the company. (Bodde & John, 2012; Werner et al, 2016). The implica-
tions occur if the agent begins serving interests that are misaligned with the investors, 
such as their own. Conflicts thus take place when the contracting parties have either 
different motivations or if incentives are implemented that place the parties on opposite 
sides of each other. (Armour et al, 2009).  
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Even though the parties are initially aligned on values and goals, this might change dur-
ing the process. A powerful and immediate way of exercising influence is for the investor 
to possess government by obtaining a board seat (Bodde & John, 2012), which the ven-
ture capitalist usually wants and seeks (FVCA) in order to be able to monitor the business 
activities and the business development. Investors are, in general, more focused on the 
exit phase than the entrepreneurs, who tend to focus on enhancing the long-term value 
of the company. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). 
 
The entrepreneur could act in a way that prioritizes own wealth over the company’s wel-
fare or keeping the business operational, even though it is not beneficial for the venture 
capitalist. This will likely affect the company’s operations and decision making negatively 
and lead to an incorrect valuation at a later stage and therefore needs proper control. 
(De Clerq & Manigart, 2007). The disagreements in the value creation are complicated 
for the venture capitalist, as it has a direct impact on the investment’s IRR (Caselli, 2018). 
 
Misaligned interest can also lead to a hold-up situation, where the entrepreneur benefits 
from their bargaining power. As has been mentioned, it is the entrepreneur who at the 
end could ensure the success of the venture but could also in a disagreement with the 
investor threaten to leave the organization. (Cumming & Johan, 2014). 
 
A further risk for the venture capitalist is if the entrepreneur brings in a new shareholder 
(Caselli, 2018). In non-syndicated ventures, the entrepreneur could, if in control, sell the 
right of control further to a third party in the threat of a possible bankruptcy. This trans-
action could harm the initial investor as it did not invest in the firm to have decision 
made by an unknown new investor that could steer the business toward undesired di-
rections. (Cumming & Johan, 2014).  
 
4.1.3 Unequal distribution of information 
Moral hazard stems from the entrepreneur both being the controlling officer and pos-
sessing as well as accessing inside information about the company that is not available 
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to the venture capitalist. Entrepreneurs have been shown tendencies to resist sharing 
information with the venture capitalists, as it could lead to them obtaining too much 
influence in the company. (Werner et al, 2016).  
 
After receiving the investment, the entrepreneur could use the information asymmetry 
to their benefit by for example misinforming or misleading the investor (Huang et al, 
2015). In practice, the entrepreneur could hide the actual status and business progress. 
The degree of uncertainty to which entrepreneurs will withhold relevant information and 
pursue own interests is referred to as agency risks. (Cumming & Johan, 2014). The con-
sequences of either misinforming or misleading the investor are especially prominent if 
the parties operate with a geographical distance between them, as it decreases the ven-
ture capitalist’s control over the entrepreneur’s actions by making monitoring harder to 
accomplish (Huang et al, 2015). As earlier noted, the entrepreneur could also mislead 
the investor by window dressing the financial statements, making the company perfor-
mance look better than what it is (Cumming & Johan, 2014).  
 
The venture capitalist has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that the capital invested is 
used for the purposes intended and that all actors are focused on the principal goal of 
obtaining satisfactory a return on their investment. Under moral hazard circumstances, 
the entrepreneur has an incentive to overstate business prospects if they do not trust 
the venture capitalist to provide further financing if the forecasts or targets are not met. 
(Gerken & Whittaker, 2014). 
 
4.1.4 Corporate risks 
The venture capitalist faces risk, where there is a possibility of losing the investment. The 
venture investments could be categorized as speculative risks, where the investors face 
both the possibility of gain but also the possibility of loss. What distinguishes speculative 
risks from other risks is that speculative risks only exist after an individual has acted upon 
a decision that has been made with the possible gain in mind. There are also risks that 
could lead to information asymmetrical implications without the direct actions of the 
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entrepreneur or an opportunistic behaviour. Entrepreneur opportunism could also arise 
when the entrepreneur acts in good faith, if the entrepreneur has minor business expe-
rience and lacks the ability to run the company as it grows, which could result in mis-
managing the invested capital. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). 
 
Venture capital is connected to great risk due to a variety of factors stemming from the 
portfolio companies being naturally more open to higher total risk than more developed 
corporations (Werner et al, 2016). There might be limited knowledge about the market 
and the future customers as well as a high uncertainty about the level of potential suc-
cess, which leads to a distinctive problem between the entrepreneurs and venture capi-
talists in the form of information asymmetry. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). Finnish SMEs 
tend to lack sufficient management skills, particularly in new technology-based firms 
where entrepreneurs have more technical than managerial knowledge, and thus often 
lack the skills to develop a successful commercial business. (Lumme et al, 2013).  
 
The portfolio companies usually have new business models and lack financial and cor-
porate data due to the short operating history. It is also difficult to obtain comparable 
market data on new, innovative business plans and the degree of comparability is hard 
to define (Werner et al, 2016). As data and information are the foundation for invest-
ment monitoring, the scarcity of data aggravates the information availability for the ven-
ture capitalist. Data scarcity could also, in the worst-case, lead to unintended accounting 
frauds, such as reviewed in the section of window dressing (Cumming & Johan, 2014).  
 
4.2 Risk management  
Risk management is according to Vinturella & Erickson (2013) the identification, analysis 
and treatment of exposures to loss. A risk exists in situations with a multiple number of 
possible outcomes, from which at least one is classified as a negative outcome. It is said 
that if there are resources that can be lost, then a potential risk is faced. Risks create 
both uncertainties and the need for offsetting possible losses, wherein the process of 
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risk management is a continuous process with ongoing company activities. (Vinturella & 
Erickson, 2013).  
 
Venture capitalists invest in start-ups and growth companies with a high uncertainty re-
garding future returns, meanwhile having an underlying information asymmetry toward 
their contracting party (Räty, 2019). With proper risk management processes and tools, 
the negative effects of information asymmetry can be reduced. It also reduces the 
amount of unsuccessful investments, ensures a proper level of risks and is an important 
factor for limited partners in their decision-making process. (Proksch et al. 2016).  
 
Rätys (2019) findings indicate that venture capitalist companies focus their risk manage-
ment efforts more on pre-investment processes, such as due diligence, diversification 
and contracting, than on post-investment processes. In post-investment processes the 
risk management is mostly related to managing portfolio company specific risks, where 
they can control risks by offering advice and support. (Räty, 2019). 
 
Theory suggests that, no matter what, agency problems will arise. It has been shown 
that, without agency issues, the principal would obtain all the risk and the agent would 
receive a fixed payment. The data of such research indicate that such an arrangement is 
not preferred by most of the entrepreneurs either, as entrepreneurs prefer to have the 
same potential for gain as the investors. Scholars have also argued that venture capital-
ists possess the ability to mitigate information problems, such as moral hazard, but that 
there are no means by which information problems are entirely eliminated. (Cumming 
& Johan, 2014).  
 
As the agency risks are presumed to be inevitable and impossible to overcome, the ven-
ture capitalist needs risk mitigation mechanisms that enable managing the conse-
quences that arise from information asymmetry. There is a need for different mitigation 
mechanisms as the risk levels fluctuate depending on the stage of the venture invest-
ment (Caselli, 2018). The root causes of the consequences associated with information 
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asymmetry also varies, due to which different mechanisms are needed depending on 
whether they are a direct consequence of the agent’s actions or solely due to the nature 
of the company. Mitigation mechanisms can be enforced by either law or through con-








5 Legal Strategies to Mitigate Information Asymmetry  
Venture capital investing is about making investment decisions under prevailing infor-
mation asymmetry (Tykvová, 2007) and regardless of the uncertain future. The earlier 
the investment stage is, the greater is the expected uncertainty of the outcome. (Huang 
et al, 2015). Agency conflicts play a vital role in shaping the relationship between the 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs that operate under these uncertain circumstances 
(Armour et al, 2009).  
 
The problems are more severe for younger firms, such as start-ups, which is why some 
venture capitalists prefer to focus on growth firms that are more established. (Amit et al, 
1998). For a venture capitalist to manage the uncertainties, different mechanisms are 
needed (Huang et al, 2015). Previous research on venture capital investing have sug-
gested a variety of control mechanisms to minimize agency costs and implications that 
are associated with moral hazard.  
 
Legal structures distribute power and payoffs within companies in order to reduce op-
portunism (Armour et al, 2009). Cumming (2006) has shown in his research, that corpo-
rate legality is a central mechanism by which agency problems can be mitigated between 
shareholders and entrepreneurs. The degree of moral hazard varies between nations, as 
it is depending on the extent to which national laws protect and enforce areas such as 
shareholder rights. (Cumming, 2006). Bellavitis et al, (2019) also show that the use of 
control rights seems to be more valuable within institutions where shareholder protec-
tion is stronger. (Bellavitis et al, 2019).  
 
Corporate law has according to Armour et al (2009) two main functions: to establish 
structures of corporate forms with supporting rules and to control agency problems 
among corporate actors. Law has therefore the important role of being able to reduce 
agency costs by the implementation of rules and procedures, where it seeks to find op-
timal solutions that maximizes the accumulated welfare of both agents and principals. 
(Armour et al, 2009).  
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As venture capitalists operate under contractual freedom, not all mitigation actions can 
be directly regulated by legislative rules and standards but also need enforcement from 
contract law. Binding contracts are important, where for example covenants are a key 
instrument in contracting, that regulate the contracting relationship by settling and de-
fining regulating rules (Caselli, 2018). Different covenants will be reviewed throughout 
this chapter and, as will be seen, venture capital contracts typically contain several sets 
of covenants (Antonczyk et al, 2011). Covenants can prove effective in mitigating the 
imbalances of information in contractual relationships and they can be either positive, 
listing what the company needs to do, or negative, included in order to forbid a set of 
actions (Caselli, 2018).  
 
Following the reasoning of Armour et al (2009), the legal strategies for reducing agency 
issues can be divided into the categories of normative regulatory strategies and descrip-
tive governance strategies. Regulatory strategies dictate substantive norms that monitor 
the contents of principal-agent relationships whereas governance strategies attempt to 
facilitate control for the principal over their agent’s behaviour. Figure 6 illustrates several 
mechanisms on legal methods of handling agency problems. Ex-ante strategies refer to 
strategies that take full effect prior to an agent’s actions and ex-post strategies refer to 
the quality of the agent’s actions in hindsight. (Armour et al, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 6: Strategies for Protecting Principals (Armour et al, 2009)  
 
The two main factors that govern contracting are economics and control. Economics re-
fer to the return that the investor receives at liquidation, whereas control refers to mech-
anisms by which the investor can exercise control over the portfolio company. 
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(Ramsinghani, 2014). The contract between the entrepreneur and the investor is built 
on an interconnection. The entrepreneur offers the investor benefits of ownership and 
knowledge-sharing and the investor offers the opportunity to spread the risks and to 
acquire financing. (Reid, 1998). An agency-principal relationship in its simplest form 
would mean that the venture capitalist, as a principal, controls contractual details and 
assign tasks to the entrepreneur who bluntly accepts this authority and performs on be-
half of the investor. In reality, the principal can only gauge the effectiveness of the agent’s 
actions indirectly, where payoffs and outcomes are the most obvious examples. (Reid, 
1998).  
 
This chapter investigates potential mitigation actions that can be utilized to reduce moral 
hazard implications. The explored mechanisms are both set at a governmental level as 
well as on individual level. The governmental strategies will be covered from a substan-
tive law point of view as well as by control mechanisms that can be exercised by individ-
ual venture capitalists, primarily related to contractual and control strategies.  
 
The framework by Armour et al (2009) will be used to explore legal mitigation actions of 
information asymmetrical risks that were identified in the previous chapter, with the en-
hancement from other research as well as the Finnish legal system. As venture capitalists 
cannot eliminate the information asymmetry of moral hazard completely (Amit et al, 
1998), potential disadvantages with the mechanisms will also be weighed in. As this dis-
sertation only deal with agency relationships prevailing after an investment has been 
established, all mechanisms will be adapted to and presented from that viewpoint. It 
should also be noted that there is no unanimous way to categorize the mitigation actions 
in the chosen framework (Armour et al, 2009), hence several mechanisms touch on the 
same areas.    
 
5.1 Agent constraints 
Legislators can directly impact the agency relationship by implementing rules and stand-
ards that constraints the agent from making decisions or from undertaking actions that 
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would be misaligned with the interests of the principal and potentially harmful for the 
investment. Rules are implemented to both require and prohibit the agent from specific 
behaviour and are commonly used to protect investors. Standards are specially designed 
for dealing with intra-corporate relations that leave the precise determination of com-
pliance to adjudicators after actions have already been undertaken and are also imple-
mented for investor protection. (Armour et al, 2009).   
 
The protection of investor rights is grounded in the widely accepted perception of the 
investor’s weaker market position. Investor protection in Finland is mainly achieved by 
regulating the obligation to provide information, which contains clauses prohibiting the 
presenting of false or misleading information (AML 1:3). The securities market law also 
sets requirements on providing investors with information continuously and regularly 
(AML). 
 
As the securities market law is applied on listed companies operating on the securities 
market, such information clauses must be contracted for the investor’s protection if de-
sired in a venture capital scenery, as the venture funds are directed toward unlisted com-
panies. However, when reaching the exit stage and IPOs, the securities market law 
obliges the company to file a prospectus for the offering of stocks according to AML 3:3. 
The prospectus helps investors to make informed investment decisions as it contains rel-
evant information about the investment security, such as the company’s key financials 
(2019/980/EU).  
 
Unlisted companies are still held responsible for following good accounting practices ac-
cordingly with the Finnish accounting law (KPL 1:3). The accounting principles set out in 
the law obliges the accountable party to give a fair and correct view of the financial sit-
uation, thus preventing the entrepreneur, in this case, from misleading or hiding infor-
mation from stakeholders. Accounting can thus have a positive effect on the informa-
tional imbalances as it reduces information asymmetry, such as window dressing, and 




On the other hand, if the reporting systems in the portfolio companies are underdevel-
oped, accounting could also provide the entrepreneur with a possibility to produce fig-
ures with a certain financial outcome in mind and, thus, still mislead the investor. (Shake-
speare, 2020).  
 
5.2 Affiliation terms  
Lawmakers can dictate terms of entry as well as exit opportunities to the principals that 
allow them to detach themselves from opportunistic agents (Armour et al, 2009). Since 
the entry terms are primarily linked to the pre-investment stage, this section will only 
cover exit strategies. However, it should be noted that negotiating investment terms and 
closing the deal is a critical stage done prior to the investment decision (Räty, 2016), that 
also impacts the relationship post-investment. This stage lays the foundation for the re-
lationship between the parties as well as the understanding of it, often in the term sheet. 
The principal seeks to sign a contract that will obtain an optimal level of effort and risk 
sharing, in order to separate the agent from minimizing efforts. (Reid, 1998). 
 
The exit strategies provide the venture capitalists with termination options, while ena-
bling monitoring over the portfolio company and thereby a better overlook of potential 
moral hazard implications. Term sheets, that often are amongst the first documents to 
be signed between the parties, is also laying out how to solve potential conflicts of in-
terest during the investment stages. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013).  
 
Due to the uncertain conditions under which venture capitalists are usually made, the 
venture capitalist often phases the commitment of capital, maintaining the option to 
withdraw from a project (Wang & Zhou, 2004) and exit the investment (Armour et al, 
2009). This is done by staged financing, which is a control mechanism where the capital 
investments are paid in separate, smaller instalments instead of all at once (Vinturella & 
Erickson, 2013). The financing is in correspondence to company development progress 
and should be supporting the company into entering the next development phase 
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(Tykvová, 2007) as well as minimizing the financial risks for venture capitalists (Cumming 
& Johan, 2014).  
 
Staged financing is implemented as covenants in order to control investment risks and 
to incentivise the entrepreneur (Tennert et al, 2018). By staging the investments, venture 
capitalists are able to reduce some of the associated investment risks (Vinturella & Er-
ickson, 2013) by learning about the company and its potential over time (Lerner & Nanda, 
2020). There can be several funding rounds and usually the invested amount grows by 
time. By scaling the investments, the investor is empowered to gather information and 
monitor the progress of projects, while retaining the option to quit (Vinturella & Erickson, 
2013) and not lose money on unprofitable projects (Wang & Zhou, 2004). Staging the 
capital funds is especially important in the earliest stages of the investment, when the 
investment risk is the highest (De Clerq & Manigart, 2007).  
 
As long as the company demonstrates success with the business plan, venture capitalists 
stage the future investments to take place every year or two to support further growth 
(Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). Between each round of financing, the investor can evalu-
ate the viability of the company and, at the same time, encourage the management of 
the company to act sensibly. (Wang & Zhou, 2004). The evaluation of viability can for 
example be a screening process of whether certain milestones are being met (Cumming 
& Johan, 2014). 
 
As the agent’s efforts are hard to observe and only noticeable at the end of each financ-
ing period, the venture capitalist has to influence the entrepreneur to put in effort al-
ready at the beginning of each period. If the entrepreneur is able to achieve the set goals 
already at the beginning of the period, the business growth is promoted, and agency 
costs minimized. (Wang & Zhou, 2004). 
 
Even though staged financing is primarily seen to benefit the investor, also the entrepre-
neur yields gains. Staging the investments allows the company to evaluate its business 
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and rise with each round, enabling the entrepreneur to decide on the source of funding 
that fits them best at each development stage. (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). By staging 
the investments, the management of the company can thus also be directed to forecast 
their business in a realistic way, under the threat that they would not receive further 
financing if targets are not met (Tykvová, 2007). 
 
Staging the capital investments need control variables, as staging the investments could 
otherwise lead to the entrepreneur window dressing their financial figures in order to 
secure the next financing round (Tykvová, 2007). The control variables could be related 
to the amount invested in each period as well as the duration and number of periods 
(Wang & Zhou, 2004).  
 
Young companies often lack proper reporting systems and regular methods of financial 
evaluation unlikely leads to reliable data as most ventures work with new business plans 
that lacks data to evaluate or conducting forecasts. Setting up financial systems with 
qualitative and accurate data within the portfolio company is nevertheless often a re-
quirement for venture capitalists, in order to prevent the entrepreneur from portraying 
the performance better than it is. (Cumming & Johan, 2014). It could also allow the ven-
ture capitalist to claim a breach of contract if the entrepreneur would engage in asset 
stripping and thereby lie about certain aspects of its business, such as asset value. (Wer-
ner et al, 2016).  
 
Another affiliation term is the right of transfer, i.e., the right to sell shares in the market, 
which is a prerequisite in the stock markets and an effective mechanism for correcting 
management behaviour. By transferring rights, the principal is replaced by a new one 
that continues the controlling over the firm. The new principal will however offer a price 
for the shares that impounds the potentially expected future loss of value due to either 




By including a buyback in the exit clauses in the contract, the venture capitalist can use 
this as an insurance of the shares being bought back in cases where an IPO or sale has 
not occurred within a certain period (Cumming, 2006). Buyback exits take place when 
investor stakes are sold to existing company shareholders and are especially effective in 
cases where the entrepreneur does not want to leave the company. Buybacks can how-
ever only occur when the shareholders actually have the money to buy back the shares. 
(Caselli, 2018). There thus remain a risk here, if the company founders do not have the 
financial means necessary to buy out the venture capitalist (Isaksson, 2006).  
 
5.3 Appointment rights 
The management has a central role in any corporation (Armour et al, 2009) and the trust 
venture capitalist has in the company management is identified as a cornerstone in a 
successful investment (Caselli, 2018). The appointment rights of directors or other man-
agers are thus a key feature of controlling a portfolio company in addressing agency 
problems, due to its nature of allocating control rights between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs. (Armour et al, 2009).  
 
Venture capitalists usually receive extensive control rights that includes board control, in 
order to influence the decision making and mitigate entrepreneur opportunism. Board 
positions thus enable, aside from advising, also monitoring (Gompers & Lerner, 2004) 
and the right to replace the entrepreneur as chief executive officer if the company un-
derperforms (De Clerq & Manigart, 2007). As the interests between venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs are not always aligned, the venture capitalist has strong incentives to 
monitor the entrepreneur’s actions and secure the use of the transferred capital (Caselli, 
2018).  
 
As has been mentioned, the venture capitalist presumably values a rapid exit higher than 
the entrepreneur, who has longer term focus to secure firm survival and generating per-
sonal income (De Clerq & Manigart, 2007). The venture capitalist wants to avoid invest-
ing in a low-value firm with a weak outlook, that the entrepreneur is either aware of, but 
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not communicating, or unaware of. The unawareness is a frequent issue due to the com-
pany valuation, which are estimated based on future values and not current values (Vin-
turella & Erickson, 2013).  
 
Corporate governance rules set out disciplines for the structure and operation of main 
company functions (Caselli, 2018). In a limited liability company, the managing director 
oversees the business administration as well as ensures the lawfulness of the company’s 
accounting and treasury (OYL 6:17). The board, on the other hand, is a strategical body 
responsible for the overall government and for guaranteeing proper business activities 
(OYL 6:2). The investor usually participates in the invested business by sitting on the 
board of directors, by which the operations of the firm can be controlled, and the invest-
ment protected (Cumming & Johan, 2014).  
 
Incorrect management decisions from the management team could have a negative im-
pact on the firm’s performance and the company value (Caselli, 2018). Obtaining a board 
seat could reduce moral hazard implications by the venture capitalist being able to steer 
the business toward a desired direction and have a comprehensive access to a portfolio 
company’s information (Räty, 2016) and thus directly monitor the company (Bellavitis et 
al, 2019). In a study conducted by Räty (2016) board seats and influencing the selection 
of the executive management team showed to be such a prominent feature that it was 
even non-negotiable to many investors. (Räty, 2016).  
 
While board control mitigates information asymmetry to a certain extent, it does not 
eliminate it completely. Board control does not guarantee a sufficient control over the 
invested company. Even though board representation guarantees a certain degree of in-
fluence over the portfolio company, board members must still act accordingly with the 
interests of all shareholders. The monitoring may also lead to a trade-off between the 





Within companies, important discussions are often held outside of board meetings and 
the information does not flow freely (Fried & Ganor, 2006). A venture capitalist may thus 
remain uniformed about important items. This implication could be further enhanced if 
the parties have a geographical distance between them, making monitoring of the en-
trepreneur’s actions harder (Huang et al, 2015) and likely decreases the number of meet-
ings held between the parties (Caselli, 2018). Researchers have thus recognized venture 
capitalists to value proximity when investing (Huang et al, 2015).  
 
5.4 Decision rights  
Supporting the decision making is what enables value creation in a venture capital in-
vestment (Caselli, 2018). Decision rights give principals the power to intervene in a firm’s 
management, by either initiating or ratifying management decisions (Armour et al, 2009). 
Bellavitis et al (2019) show that venture capitalists negotiate board seats and veto rights 
in accordance with the perceived degree of moral hazard risk. Decision rights are control 
rights, by which the venture capitalist can control desired outcomes while blocking un-
desired outcomes. (Bellavitis et al, 2019). 
 
Restrictive covenants can be included in the investment’s legal documents that allocate 
control rights to investors (Bengtsson, 2009). Board control is thus often combined with 
the venture capitalist receiving protective provisions, that can for example require ven-
ture capitalist approval for certain transactions, like the sale of assets. A further possible 
step is for the venture capitalist to negotiate for a catch-all provision, that would require 
venture capitalist approval for most major transactions. (Fried & Ganor, 2006). Simulta-
neously, these clauses could also provide the venture capitalist with covenanted veto 
rights, enabling the venture capitalist to deny important business decisions and to im-
pose constraints on the entrepreneur’s decision making (Bengtsson, 2009).  
 
The venture capital contract can also include a clause that prevents the entrepreneur 
from selling their quotas against the will of the venture capitalist. Such covenants would 
thus require venture capitalist approval before an entrepreneur sells their shares to a 
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third party. Pre-emption clauses are an important clause to include, as they empower 
existing partners the right to buy shares from the other existing party and prohibits a 
party from exiting the investment by the selling of shares. Another related clause is a 
permitted transfer clause, that ensures stability between the parties’ commitments. (Ca-
selli, 2018).  
 
Covenants are however costly as they are related to bargaining and enforcement efforts. 
Bengtsson (2009) therefore imply that these should only be used if “control right alloca-
tions lead to a net reduction in conflicts of interest and thus increases the overall com-
pany value”. (Bengtsson, 2009).  
 
5.5 Agent incentives  
The third governance strategy, and fifth legal strategy, is agent incentives. The principal 
can by reward strategies recognize the agent for successful advancement of the princi-
pal’s interests (Armour et al, 2009) in the form of incentives, that reduces moral hazard 
by steering the entrepreneur to put in effort and to work toward common goals (Wang 
et al, 2016).  
 
Incentives can be executed through sharing rules, that motivates loyalty by tying the 
agent’s monetary returns directly to the principals. Another option is to use a pay-for-
performance system, where the agent is still paid for advancing the principals interests 
but not sharing the principals returns. (Armour et al, 2009). Establishing performance-
linked pays is also a way to incentivise the portfolio company’s management (Reid, 1998). 
 
Steering the entrepreneur toward desired actions can be done through rewards. The 
impact of information asymmetry can be reduced through rewarding the agent when 
their acts are in accordance with the objectives set by the principal (Jensen, 1983). The 
lack of complete observability of actions could possibly mean that the entrepreneur is 
required to agree to a contract with an incentive for effort and in which at least some 




Armour et al (2009) state that the trusteeship strategy removes conflicts of interest ex-
ante. Past research believe that reputation is a crucial component of the incentive mech-
anism (Wang et al, 2016). The trusteeship strategy state that agents will respond to in-
centives such as conscience, pride and reputation to manage the principal’s interests in 
the absence of monetary incentives. (Armour et al, 2009). For example, if the entrepre-
neur has a fairness preference, it has been shown that the incentive degree to them from 
the venture capitalist will increase (Wang et al, 2016).  
 
The earlier covered control mechanism of staged financing could also be seen as an in-
centivizing mechanism, where the venture capitalist is able to steer the entrepreneur to 
work toward the desired, common goals (Tykvová, 2000). Cumming & Johan (2008) have 
also raised interest alignment as a way to manage information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts (Cumming & Johan, 2008). Achieving certain milestones secures them the next 
financing round. By staging the financing, the entrepreneur is kept motivated to put in 
effort and work toward success. (Tykvová, 2000).  
 
Incentives as a reward structure require monitoring and agency costs are thus not re-
moved. It is hard for the venture capitalist to identify the extent to which an outcome is 
due to the entrepreneur’s agent and actions and not simply due to good fortune. Also, 
the asymmetric information is not completely removed since the agent is still in posses-
sion of superior knowledge regarding business operations. (Reid, 1998).  
 
Preferred equity also represents one method by which monitoring difficulties can be 
dealt with from an incentive-compatible manner (Trester, 1998). Preferred shares are 
the most adapted form of securities in some countries, as they possess advantages over 
common shares such as special voting rights, being convertible and have dividend and 
liquidation preferences. As common shares do not offer the investor any special rights, 
they are rarely chosen as securities especially at early development stages. (Vinturella & 
Erickson, 2013). The venture capital investment also often contains clauses that allow 
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the venture capitalists the conversion of shares, that also are a way to reduce information 
asymmetry and entrepreneur opportunism. (Trester, 1998).  
 
The distinction between preferred and common shares is not as prominent in the Finnish 
legal system as it is for example in the U.S., OYL 3:1 however covers the conversion of 
shares. Clauses on share conversion are usually included in the shareholder’s agreement 
that outlines the ownership, where the investor wants to secure that the cooperation 
with the company will run smoothly by keeping the management committed to the com-
pany through taking them into account in the distribution of shares. (FVCA).  
 
Many venture capitalists also include contractual clauses that where the entrepreneur’s 
stock options do not become effective until a few years after the initial contract or upon 
the company achieving certain milestones (Cumming & Johan, 2014). By vesting the en-
trepreneur’s equity over a time period, the losses generated by a hold-up situation could 
be minimized as vesting provisions puts the entrepreneur at loss of the right to obtain 
additional funding, in case they quit their job contradictory with the venture capitalists 
interests (Antonczyk et al, 2011).    
 
5.6 Other contractual strategies 
Previous research declares contracting as an effective mechanism both in reducing 
agency costs and in controlling other risks. (Wang & Zhou, 2004; Gompers, 1995). Nearly 
any contractual relationship in which one party is under performance obligation to an-
other party is a potential subject to agency problems (Armour et al, 2009). The problem 
lies in motivating the agent to act in the principal’s interests rather than simply their own 
(Armour et al, 2009). 
 
The legal strategies that have been covered are dependent on the existence of other 
legal institutions, such as courts, to secure that the legal norms are enforced and that 
principals intervene to generate interest conformity (Armour et al, 2009). To a high ex-
tent, the mitigation strategies that have been covered so far are also contractual 
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strategies (Armour et al, 2009). For example, the agent constraints, as reviewed in the 
first section of the chapter, can also be included in legal documents between the entre-
preneur and venture capitalist. By contracting the behaviours of the entrepreneur as well 
as stating the rules about financial expenditures, the investor stays in control of their 
invested funds and moral hazard is mitigated. (Waarsenburg, 2017). There are also other 
contractual strategies in mitigating information asymmetry that will be covered next.  
 
5.6.1 Syndication agreement 
A frequently used investment strategy, where multiple venture capitalists coordinates an 
investment, is called a syndication (Lerner, 1994). The basic idea is that each investor 
within the syndicate puts in a capital fund in the proportion of the amount that is needed 
to fund the business, in order to share risks and resources (Cumming & Johan, 2014). 
Syndicating investments are common especially in early stage companies within the ven-
ture capital sector (Cumming & Johan, 2014) as it provides investors with collaboration, 
sharing of information (Lerner, 1994) and increases investment power (Caselli, 2018). 
Syndications are a method to reduce problems that are generated from informational 
asymmetries, due to which it also is argued to lead to better business performance and 
an ability to pick out high-quality projects (Lerner, 1994).  
 
Syndicate agreements govern the relationship between the investors, where it for exam-
ple outlines monitoring strategies of the syndicate. The co-investors are chosen by the 
portfolio firm and the lead venture capitalist. In conditions of high uncertainty, it is prof-
itable to have mutual trust and understanding and thus partner with a similar investor. 
At mature stages diversity is given a different value. (Huang et al, 2015).  
 
As earlier mentioned, there can be proximity preferences in the screening of potential 
investment opportunities. Syndication could be a solution to such geographical issues, 
as a foreign firm could invest with local investors that would assist them in the monitor-




Previous research state that with syndication, better decision making is related to eval-
uating a firm’s potential (Cumming & Johan, 2014). Under conditions of high uncertainty, 
it could be profitable to have mutual trust and understanding by partnering with an in-
vestor (Huang et al, 2015). Syndication agreements are also utilized closer to the exit 
stage. As the venture approaches a potential IPO, many venture capitalists prefer to form 
a syndicate to handle selling of the issue (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013).  
 
Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007) have also found evidence on syndications being 
costly on post-investment performance, due to less effort being put in (Casamatta & 
Haritchabalet, 2007). Such costs can also arise from difficulties coordinating between 
principals, that would lead principals to delegate more of their decision making to agents. 
Multiple principals can also lead to difficulties in monitoring the agent or in deciding 
when and whether to intervene with actions (Armour et al, 2009). To reduce such coor-
dination costs, Bellavitis et al (2019) propose that familiarity, i.e. co-investing with the 
same syndicate partners over time, could reduce possible conflicts (Bellavitis et al, 2019).  
 
5.6.2 Active involvement 
As the consequences stemming from moral hazard-situations can be highly harmful to a 
venture capitalists portfolio company, it is necessary for the venture capitalists to super-
vise and monitor the entrepreneur’s activities continuously. The active involvement of 
the venture capitalist in the invested firm is a way of reducing the moral hazard implica-
tions (Amit et al, 1998).  
 
Venture capitalists vary in their interactions with the entrepreneurs and the post-invest-
ment relations between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs can be close and con-
structive, in the context that the venture capitalist provides advise, utilizes business con-
tacts and facilitate the financing. The relationship also consists of monitoring the perfor-
mance in a variety of ways. (Reid, 1998). Monitoring rights such as voting rights, board 
seat rights and liquidation rights are all formalities which are contracted and have been 
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covered. However, there are also other, less formal, active monitoring strategies a ven-
ture capitalist can undertake.  
 
As venture capitalists are to a great extent dependent on those at the core of the busi-
ness providing them with information, the monitoring is usually performed by superin-
tending, influencing and interfering in the portfolio company whenever necessary (Wer-
ner et al, 2016). Without monitoring, the entrepreneur is assumed to be indifferent be-
tween effort and no effort. However, if monitoring occurs, Reid (1998) shows that the 
entrepreneur will prefer to exercise effort instead of refraining from doing so. Sharehold-
ers’ agreements can set an informational obligation to the portfolio company, whereby 
the management is committed to provide its investors with information. In practice, this 
can mean e.g. monthly or quarterly reporting. (Reid, 1998).    
 
It is important for a venture capitalist to select the right managers and to track changes 
in the quality of the personnel as well as other changes that can impact the quality of 
management. In addition to board meetings, venture capitalists can hold frequent meet-
ings and reviews with the portfolio company where the entrepreneur is expected to pro-
vide them with information (Caselli, 2018). This is, as earlier mentioned, a method to 
obtain investor rights equal to those of listed companies set out in the securities market 
law. The frequency of the meetings could be dependent on the company performance 
but should be held monthly or at least quarterly. Information is expected to be provided 
regarding items such as potential risks that could be harmful to the investment perfor-
mance as well as financial and operational data. (Caselli, 2018).   
 
Such special information rights are a widely established contracting element (Antonczyk 
et al, 2011). As Välimäki (2014) notes, information covenants are widely used in financial 
agreements and are a means by which the entrepreneur, in the context of this study, is 
obliged to provide venture capitalists with information (Välimäki, 2014). Information cov-
enants support a continuous communication between the parties, allowing the venture 




Previous research has found that partners within a venture firm who have prior business 
experience are more prone to be active in the portfolio companies and that activity gen-
erates better business performance (Bottazzi, 2009). On the other hand, a high activity 
level in the portfolio company could also have a negative effect, where venture capital-






In this chapter the thesis will be concluded by summarizing the study and discussing the 
most relevant research findings as well as contributions. Thereby a further consideration 
is given to the research limitations as well as to suggestions for further research.  
 
6.1 Research findings 
This paper has reviewed literature and studies which present the current state of re-
search in the rapidly developing field of entrepreneurial finance. Venture capital invest-
ments have become an established funding source that provide start-ups with both cap-
ital funding and know-how. The investments are said to support innovation, as start-ups 
and early stage growth companies are vital for economic growth, but often lack the re-
sources necessary to materialize their business plans (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013). Ven-
ture capital markets are characterized by multiple asymmetrical information problems 
in an uncertain environment, out of which most related actions are typically non verifia-
ble, making it difficult to cover ex-post actions to a complete extent (Tykvová, 2007).  
 
Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs enter contracts that influence their behavior and 
mitigates agency costs arising from information asymmetry, by selecting an appropriate 
kind of financing and by specifying rights and obligations for both contracting parties. 
Amit et al (1998) state that venture capitalists are investors that become skilled at se-
lecting good projects in environments with hidden information and that they are good 
at monitoring as well as advising entrepreneurs who might be in the risk zone of moral 
hazard implications. (Amit et al, 1998).  
 
The overall purpose of the thesis was to increase the understanding of legal mitigation 
actions that the venture capitalist has at hand to reduce the implications arising from 





The research question was formed as: 
 
How venture capitalists can, through legal strategies, mitigate post-investment 
risks related to information asymmetry arising from the relationship with the en-
trepreneur  
 
By considering the research question and the theoretical framework of information 
asymmetry, especially that of moral hazard, a schematic structure of post-investment 
risks was established. Changes in the entrepreneur’s behavior, misaligned interests be-
tween the contracting parties and unequal distribution of information were identified as 
risks that are directly related to the actions of the entrepreneur. Information asymmet-
rical risks indifferent to the actions of the agents was identified as corporate risks asso-
ciated with the start-up nature of the portfolio firms.  
 
In order to tackle the post-investment risks, another schematic structure was used to 
explore the legal mitigation actions within risk management. This thesis utilized the cat-
egorization established by Armour et al (2009), who divides the mechanisms into regu-
latory strategies and governance strategies. Existing research and the Finnish legal sys-
tem were screened in order to examine the different methods, whereas the following 
mitigation strategies could be recognized for the identified post-investment risks: 
 
 
Figure 7: Legal mechanisms targeting post-investment risks 
 
Thereby, an answer is given to the research question. The venture capitalist can through 
agent constraints, affiliation terms, appointment rights, decision rights and agent incen-
tives mitigate post-investment risks. These are strategies dependent on the existence of 
courts, or other legal institutions, in order to secure the enforcement of legal norms 
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(Armour et al, 2009). More independently of legal institutions, but still within the frame 
of contract law, other contractual strategies of syndication agreements and active in-
volvement were identified as additional mitigation mechanisms. 
 
Agent constraints and affiliation terms are based on the findings in this thesis most effi-
cient in the sense that they strongly target all the identified post-investment risks. Mat-
ters such as monitoring difficulties and costly control mechanisms are nevertheless still 
prevailing. Appointment rights and decision rights both target many of the identified 
post-investment risks but fail in this context to target all risks as strongly as the first two. 
Agent incentives are mostly focusing on entrepreneurial behavior and, thus, mainly able 
to target the risks of changes in behavior as well as misaligned interests. Other contrac-
tual strategies are also a mechanism that has been identified to target all risks, which is 
natural considering the grouping of legal mechanisms included in the concept.  
 
The analysis of extant research however shows that, while the implications of infor-
mation asymmetry in venture capital investments are well understood, there are still no 
mechanism that can reduce the implications to a complete extent. This is a conclusion 
aligned with what Amit et al (1998) and Cumming & Johan (2014) have previously noted. 
The main management recommendation derived from the analysis in this paper is that 
a combination of different mitigation actions is the most efficient strategy to target post-
investment risks. A combination would secure that all post-investment risks are targeted 
and would, at the same time, reduce the net value of the negative consequences that 
the shortfalls associated with each mechanism potentially causes. 
 
6.2 Contributions 
Previous research has to a great extent focused on information asymmetry occurring 
prior to an investment decision, whereas this dissertation has explored the less re-
searched topic of post-investment information asymmetry. The research thus contrib-
utes to the academical field of financial law by applying a new angle to the legal mitiga-
tion strategies for post-investment risks that can be fulfilled under the Finnish legal 
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system. This study could also confirm what previous scholars have already stated, that 
there are no bulletproof mechanisms to target information asymmetry. 
 
6.3 Limitations  
As the nature of the study is explorative, it is important to highlight the limitations what 
comes to directing the research area to the Finnish market. The primary limitations have 
occurred in screening the Finnish legal system for rules, norms and court cases. The ex-
isting regulations and research related to the Finnish legal system are limited, as the re-
search field is dominated by studies from the U.S. The probable reasons are two-folded, 
as it could both be due to venture capital being a relatively new area in Finland, as well 
as the contractual freedom of the parties when entering an agreement.  
 
As venture capital is still a relatively young field of research in Finland, more attention 
should be given to research topic in a national context. The contributions remain limited 
in parallel to the limitations with prior research in Finland.   
 
6.4 Suggestions for further research 
For further research, it would be valuable to conduct a qualitative study that explores 
the deployment of legal mitigation strategies within individual companies. It would be 
of interest to investigate how the mechanisms are used. It would also be interesting to 
see which are considered to be the most important ones as well as what factors impact 
the selection of a risk mitigation strategy.  
 
A qualitative research could further be related to a firm’s size. This study has brought 
forward conclusions that would generally suit venture capital firms independent of the 
firm size. However, a company’s risk management presumably differs between small and 
medium-sized enterprises in relation to large enterprises. In a more extensive study, dif-




This thesis is limited to exploring the relationship between the venture capitalists and 
the entrepreneurs but, as has been noted, the main actors in an investment also include 
investors. It could thus be of academical interest to investigate the relationship a fund 
investor has with the venture capitalist. Another related possibility for future research 
could be to explore the information asymmetry between the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur also from the entrepreneur’s perspective. This would be an interesting an-
gle, as it puts forth other information asymmetrical implications such as the challenges 
an entrepreneur faces in receiving funding or encountering unfavourable contract terms. 
If a qualitative study would be conducted, a dyadic nature could be chosen for the re-
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